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Abstract: We study the coevolutionary dynamics of the diversity of phenotype ex-
pression and the evolution of cooperation in the Prisoner’s Dilemma game. Rather
than pre-assigning zero-or-one interaction rate, we diversify the rate of interaction
by associating it with the phenotypes shared in common. Individuals each carry a
set of potentially expressible phenotypes and expresses a certain number of pheno-
types at a cost proportional to the number. The number of expressed phenotypes and
thus the rate of interaction is an evolvable trait. Our results show that nonnegligible
cost of expressing phenotypes restrains phenotype expression, and the evolutionary
race mainly proceeds on between cooperative strains and defective strains who ex-
press a very few phenotypes. It pays for cooperative strains to express a very few
phenotypes. Though such a low level of expression weakens reciprocity between
cooperative strains, it decelerates rate of interaction between cooperative strains and
defective strains to a larger degree, leading to the predominance of cooperative strains
over defective strains. We also find that evolved diversity of phenotype expression
can occasionally destabilize due to the invasion of defective mutants, implying that
cooperation and diversity of phenotype expression can mutually reinforce each other.
Therefore, our results provide new insights into better understanding the coevolution
of cooperation and the diversity of phenotype expression.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The emergence and persistence of cooperative behaviors in populations of selfish individuals
is a key problem in evolutionary biology [1–11]. The Prisoner’s Dilemma game provides a con-
venient paradigm to address this problem. In the game, a cooperator brings a benefit of b to her
coplayer at a cost of c to herself. A defector produces no benefit and incurs no cost. As b > c > 0,
the best strategy for an individual is to defect irrespective of her coplayer’s strategy. However,
the total payoff would be maximized if both have adhered to cooperation. The dissonance in the
optimal strategy for an individual and for the group leads to the social dilemma.
To resolve the dilemma, a variety of mechanisms [12, 13] promoting the evolution of cooper-
ation have been proposed. The tag based interactions have been intensively studied [14–23]. Its
essence lies in that individuals can recognize each other by tags and cooperators just help those
sufficiently similar to themselves. By this simple rule, the authors [14] have pointed out that coop-
eration can arise without reciprocity. When “never to donate” is incorporated as a possible strategy,
similarity can still breed cooperation but only when mutations towards “never to donate” are not
very strong [16, 17]. Traulsen and his coworkers have captured the essence of this model [14] by
considering two tags and two levels of tolerance [19]. They also extended this tag-based interac-
tions to structured populations [20] and well-mixed populations of finite size [21]. Tanimoto found
that a two-dimensional tag space promotes cooperation more effectively than the one-variable tag
system [18].
When it comes to spatial populations, Axelrod et al. have found that cooperation can coevolve
with tags in structured populations. Another far-reaching work [24] has probed the effects of beard
chromodynamics on the evolution of cooperation, and revealed that loosening coupling between
tag and strategy attenuates the oscillation of the population dynamics, reinforcing the beard color
diversity and thus inducing higher levels of cooperation. Our work [22] has shown that adaptive
tag switching can reinforce the coevolution of tag diversity and contingent cooperation even when
tag switching is costly.
When strategy and tag mutate independently, a large body of work has addressed the evolution
of cooperation under selection-mutation dynamics [25–29]. In Ref. [25], the authors have consid-
ered a model with two strategies, contingent cooperation and defection. Each individual possesses
a phenotype. Contingent cooperators just cooperate with these individuals of the same phenotype.
By virtue of coalescent theory and perturbation theory, this work derived a very simple criteria,
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(R − P)(1 +
√
3) > T − S , for contingent cooperation to be selected. Using similar mathematical
tools, Tarnita et al. have considered the multiplexity of tags [26]. Each individual is affiliated
with n groups out of the total m groups inhabitable. In this context, they gave the conditions under
which cooperation can evolve. They have also applied this framework to study the competition of
multiple strategies and give the terse condition for a specific strategy to be selected [27].
Generally speaking, these models share two points in common. First, individuals are equally
accessible to each phenotype (or tag) in a pre-assigned set of phenotypes available. And secondly,
the interaction rate is binary. In the case of phenotypes being discrete, when sharing the same
phenotype, two individuals interact. In the context of continuous tags, individuals just help those
who differ with them in tag by no more than their tolerances.
Recent experimental studies have demonstrated that in terms of phenotype traits such as co-
operativeness, resistance to antibiotic or competence, a high level of diversity can arise even in
an isogenic population [30–35]. Individuals are capable of switching between phenotypes. By
phenotype switching, the population can either optimize fitness [34, 35], or survive unpredictable
environmental fluctuations [30–32], or preserve some properties [33]. The implications of these
observations are threefold: individuals reserve redundant phenotypes; individuals are endowed
with ability to switch phenotypes; fitness of phenotypes varies with environments. Meanwhile
these studies have mainly concentrated on the species-environment systems, and delved into the
importance of phenotype switching and its diversity for viability of organisms. Yet direct interac-
tions between individuals are left largely unconsidered [30–35].
Furthermore, although previous studies on phenotype similarity based cooperation [14–17, 19–
22, 24–27, 36] have considered direct interactions between individuals, these models have not
dealt with difference in expressing phenotypes, leading to the binary interaction rate. A natural
question arises what the evolutionary dynamics would be when individuals differ in ability of ex-
pressing phenotypes? We shall answer this question using a model integrating the diversity of
phenotype expression and individual-individual interactions. Instead of uniformly expressing one
of the potentially expressible phenotypes, our present model allows individuals each to express
a subset of the potentially expressible phenotypes costly. The subset may vary with individual
and evolves over time. This diversity in phenotype expression necessarily induces diversity in
similarity. Unlike the zero-or-one interaction rate, two players met play the Prisoner’s Dilemma
game with likelihood positively relying on how many phenotypes they share of those they have ex-
pressed. The higher degree of the similarity between two individuals, the more likely they interact.
3
In fact, several but not many studies have dedicated to investigating the effects of stochastic inter-
actions [37, 38] on the evolution of cooperation. Traulsen et al. have considered the stochasticity
of interactions between neighbored individuals [38]. Chen et al. have introduced the stochastic
interactions into the spatial Prisoner’s Dilemma game. In these studies [37, 38], the interaction
stochasticity is pre-assigned and thus does not evolve.
II. MODEL
Consider a well-mixed population of finite size (= N). These N individuals compete to survive.
Reproduction is asexually and subject to mutation. Each individual i is characterized by a triplet
(si, Ki,Gi). The first entry si denotes i’s strategy. In the Prisoner’s Dilemma game, si can be either
cooperation or defection. For the sake of calculation, we let si = 1 if i is a cooperator and si = 0 if
i is a defector. Gi is the potentially expressible phenotypes individual i carries. For we are mainly
concerned with the diversity of phenotype expression, we assume Gi is a constant, say Gi ≡ G. Ki
represents the phenotypes individual i has actually expressed.
Each individual randomly expresses a number of the potentially expressible phenotypes. This
means Ki ⊆ G. As the expression is random, even if two individuals express the same number
of phenotypes, the specific phenotypes expressed can be different. Only phenotypes expressed
are observable. Instead of assuming the zero-or-one interaction rate, we diversify the rate of
interaction by associating it with the phenotypes shared in common. When two individuals i and
j meet, the probability they play the game is dependent on how many identical phenotypes they
possess of all the phenotypes expressed. Obviously, when both individuals i and j have expressed
all phenotypes, they would interact with probability 1. When both share no phenotype of all those
expressed, no interaction would happen. The larger number of phenotypes they share, the more
likely they interact. Therefore, we introduce a function r(Ki, K j) to denote the interaction rate. For
simplicity we first consider the linear interaction rate. In this linear mode, the probability that two
individuals interact is proportional to the phenotypes they share (see figure 1).
At the same time, individuals need to bear the cost of expressing phenotypes. The cost is as-
sumed to be proportional to the number of phenotypes expressed, that is, κi(Ki) = θ · Ki. Here we
choose the simplest possible cost function of expressing phenotype. Therefore, the payoff consists
of two parts: the payoff resulting from game interactions and the cost of expressing phenotypes.
The net payoff pii determines the reproductive success of individual i. Here the fitness is an ex-
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ponential function of payoff, say fi = e
βpii , where β is the intensity of selection, specifying the
contribution of the game to fitness.
The evolutionary updating is represented by a frequency-dependent Moran process. At each
time step, each individual interacts with all other N − 1 individuals depending on their expressed
phenotypes and accrues payoffs. Payoff is mapped into fitness. Then an individual is chosen to
reproduce an offspring with probability proportional to its fitness. Following birth, a randomly
selected individual in the population is assigned to die and replaced. The population size thus re-
mains constant throughout the evolution. Reproduction is subject to mutation. With probability µ,
the offspring with equal probability adopts one of the two behavioral strategies and also randomly
expresses a number, say K
′
i
, of phenotypes at a cost θK
′
i
.
III. RESULTS
We start with presenting the pairwise invasion dynamics, which shall help better understand
the full population dynamics. When mutant defectors attempt to invade resident defectors, game
interactions, whether or not they really happen, bring about nothing to payoff. This is due to the
fact that defector-defector interaction generates no benefit to and charges no cost of the defectors
involved. Payoff just consists of the cost of expressing phenotypes. The more phenotypes they
express, the higher cost defectors pay. As a consequence, those defectors who express too many
phenotypes place themselves in a least competent position. This explains why the plot peaks at
the bottom right corner and unfolds downward towards the top left corner (see figure 2d).
In fact, this property can be rigorously corroborated. Suppose that the invading defectors
express KY phenotypes and the invaded defectors express KX phenotypes. Independent of the
population composition and the phenotypes actually expressed, the fitness is e−βθKY and e−βθKX ,
for an invader and a resident, respectively. Denote by ρk
X→Y the fixation probability that a
single mutant Y takes over the resident population X when X and Y share k common phe-
notypes among their expressed phenotypes. We can readily obtain the fixation probability as
ρk
X→Y =
1−eβθ(KY−KX )
1−eβθN(KY−KX ) for all k possibly allowed. Using Equation (1) as presented in Methods Sec-
tion, we can get the transition rate of the populationmoving from state (X, KX) to the state (Y, KY ) as
Q(X, Y; KX, KY ) =
1−eβθ(KY−KX )
1−eβθN(KY−KX ) ·
∑
k 1. It can be easily verified that the transition rate Q(X, Y; KX, KY)
decreases with KY and increases with KX, respectively.
The pairwise dynamics exhibit similar cascading property when mutant cooperators attempt to
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invade resident defectors (see figure 2b). Obviously, expressing more phenotypes affects cooper-
ators’ evolutionary fate in three fronts. It undoubtedly reinforces reciprocity between cooperators
themselves. It increases cost of expressing these phenotypes. In the third place, it also gets more
likely for defectors to chase after these cooperators by expressing more phenotypes, and thus rais-
ing the rate of interaction between cooperators and defectors. Indeed, when resident defectors
express a very few phenotypes, they have very little chance to exploit cooperators. This leaves
more time space for mutant cooperators to reach the invasion barrier. As KX increases, the third
effect becomes more conspicuous though invaded defectors also incur a bit higher cost of express-
ing phenotypes. These two negative effects offset and then overwhelms the reinforced reciprocity
of mutant cooperators, resulting from incremental KY . In other words, when resident defectors
have already expressed many phenotypes, mutant cooperators are unlikely to increase the chance
of invading by expressing more phenotypes. These are reasons why the black line, corresponding
to 1/N fixation probability, rises approximately linearly for small KX, and gradually gets flattened
as KX further increases.
Interesting scenarios are observed when mutant defectors attempt to invade resident coopera-
tors (see figure 2c). Only when both mutation defectors and resident cooperators express a very
large number of phenotypes, these defectors can take over the whole population with probability
higher than 1/N. This observation has an important implication. Whenever resident cooperators
express so many phenotypes, defectors can expand their expressed phenotypes to exploit coopera-
tors more severely. As it happens, payoffs for defectors due to the defector-cooperator interactions
not only offset the cost of expressing more phenotypes but also put defectors in an advantageous
position. This observation vanishes when resident cooperators express a very few phenotypes, sug-
gesting that cooperators can dodge defectors’ exploitation by unilaterally constraining phenotype
expression.
The invasion dynamics show a saddle shape along the line directing from (1, 1) to (20, 20)
when mutant cooperators compete with resident cooperators (see figure 2a). No matter how many
phenotypes, say KX, resident cooperators express, mutant cooperators that express phenotypes of
a number KY most approximating KX are most likely to invade resident cooperators, though the
fixation is still less than 1
N
. Reasons for this property vary as KX differs. For small KX, when KY
is larger than KX, the cost of expressing more phenotypes cannot be compensated by combined
effects of sucking resident cooperators more and weak reciprocity between mutant cooperators.
When KY is less than KX, mutant cooperators can hardly mutually breed, and thus being eclipsed
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by resident cooperators who always interact with each other albeit at a low rate. For large KX, small
KY would prevent mutant cooperators from exploiting resident cooperators. Moreover, reciprocity
between resident cooperators is so strong that mutant cooperators are least likely to invade. Even
for KX in between, mutant cooperators cannot raise the fixation probability by expressing either
more or less phenotypes than KX.
With the pairwise invasion dynamics scrutinized, we are now able to address the full popula-
tion dynamics. Consider the competition of an arbitrary number of strains (= 2G) in a finite-size
population. The population is well-mixed. In the absence of mutation, the population dynamics
inevitably end up in monomorphic state due to the stochastic nature of the evolutionary dynamics
and the update rule. In the limit of small mutation, there are at most two strains competing in
the population at the same time. Before next mutation occurs, the invaders either successfully
take over the whole population or are wiped out. For this reason, the population dynamics can
be approximated by an embedded Markov chain of size 2G, with each homogeneous state corre-
sponding to one possible state of the population associated with a strategy and a given number of
phenotypes expressed. The transition rates between states are given as Equation (1) in Methods
Section. The stationary distribution of this Markov chain characterizes the fraction of time the
population spends in each of these 2G homogeneous states, and can be analytically computed.
Figure 3 presents the equilibrium level of these 2G strains as the parameter θ varies. Generally
speaking, the population dynamics can be divided into three classes. For very small θ, fraction
of defective strains monotonically increases as phenotypes expressed grow (see figures 3a and b).
When it comes to cooperative strains, the distribution of fractions exhibits a U-shape curve. It
should be noted that the total level of defective strains is significantly higher than that of coop-
erative strains. As θ rises, for both cooperative strains and defective strains, those who express
a very large number of phenotypes are depressed, while fractions of those expressing a very few
phenotypes tilt upward (see figures 3c and d). For θ is as high as 0.10, both distributions for defec-
tive strains and cooperative strains exhibit U-shapes, respectively. At this time, the total level of
cooperative strains is comparable to that of defective strains. Further raising θ induces monotoni-
cally decreasing fraction distributions of both cooperative strains and defective strains (see figures
3d, e and f). That is, the more phenotypes expressed, the less fraction of corresponding strains.
Cooperative strains enjoy remarkable advantage over defective strains in the evolutionary race.
Explanations for these properties next follow.
For small θ, the more phenotypes the defectors express, the more likely they exploit cooper-
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ators, the higher their fractions in the long run, a feature invariable as long as θ is lower than a
certain value. For cooperative strains, a different picture emerges. In order to escape defectors’
exploitation, cooperators have two choices: either to reduce phenotypes expressed or to reinforce
reciprocity by expressing more phenotypes. Either choice turns out effective in defending defec-
tors’ invasion. Of the two, the later is more effective but still to a limited degree. Worst situation
emerges when cooperators express a modest number of phenotypes. They can neither shun off
interactions with defectors nor breed themselves strong enough to resist invasion of defectors. As
a result, the fractions of these cooperative strains are lowest. A representative evolutionary process
is invoked to present the core component of the population dynamics (see figure 4a).
As θ increases to moderate level such as 0.1, advantages of defective strains expressing many
phenotypes are depressed. It is because this advantage can be enjoyed only when competing
cooperative strains also express a very large number of phenotypes. Recognizing this situation,
cooperative strains can ward off invasion of defective strains by reducing expressing phenotypes.
Once this happens, these cooperative strains always interact with each other with a constant small
rate. Defective strains need to decipher which phenotypes cooperative strains have expressed from
scratch. It takes them time. Hardly have they deciphered cooperative strains’ phenotypes when
they are already wiped out.
It makes defective strains harder to chase after and exploit cooperative strains as θ further
increases. As mutation is uniform and unbiased, the evolutionary force uniquely determines the
eventual fate of strains. Resident defective strains expressing a large number of phenotypes can
be easily invaded by defective strains, or cooperative strains, when both just express not so many
phenotypes. For resident defective strains expressing a very few phenotypes, it may happen from
time to time that they attempt to exploit cooperative strains by expressing more phenotypes, but
as soon as they do so they will be pulled back. As a result, defective strains most of the time
are entrenched in low levels with respect to phenotype expression. This no doubt constrains the
ability of defective strains in deciphering and exploiting cooperative strains. For defective strains
with low-level phenotype expression, they are outperformed by cooperative strains with similar
level of phenotype expression as the later can enjoy the weak mutual breed almost certainly. The
population dynamics are graphically illustrated by a typical process (see figure 4b).
Hitherto, our results have shown that cooperation coevolves with diversity of phenotype ex-
pression under a wider range of conditions and that expressing fewer phenotypes can best promote
cooperation. It pays for cooperators to express a very few phenotypes, thereby improving their
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opportunity of establishing weak reciprocity, as these few randomly expressed phenotypes serve
as secret handshakes and are difficult for defectors to discover and chase after. Trade-off between
these two forces leads to the symbiosis of diversity of phenotype expression and the highest frac-
tion of such cooperative strains. Our results also show that once defective strains dominate, the
population dynamics are extremely unstable. In contrast, cooperative strains can prevail over the
population over continuous periods of time, or long or short, but a prerequisite is that these cooper-
ative strains must have randomly expressed a very few phenotypes. Thus a strong interdependence
between the evolution of cooperation and diversity of phenotype expression is formed. More-
over, further investigation should aim to explore the forms of cost of expressing phenotypes and
relationship between interaction rate and degree of similarity.
IV. DISCUSSION
Mounting efforts have been invested in exploring solutions to the evolution of cooperation [2,
3, 28, 29, 39–47]. Our study provides a possible path for establishing cooperation, in which the
evolved diversity of phenotype expression plays a crucial role. Our study still comes into the
domain of chromodynamics of cooperation [21, 24], but differs decisively from preceding studies
on this topic [21, 24]. In these studies, cooperators try to ward off defectors’ exploitation through
secret tags. When they run faster enough, cooperators dominate the population. A variety of ways
can achieve this purpose [19–22, 24], such as prescribing high levels of phenotypic diversity [21],
weakening the coupling of tag and strategy [24], introducing interaction stochasticity [37]. The
mechanism we proposed that interaction diversity induced by evolvable phenotype expression
engenders similar effects as theirs [24]. In this sense, our mechanism is paralleled to them [21, 24]
and thus broadening ‘other mechanisms that can accomplish the same stabilizing effect’ as the
authors of Ref. [24] have suggested.
Moreover, our study is original in diversifying the expression of phenotypes. Previous studies
dealing with interaction rates can be mainly divided into two classes. The first class [19–21,
24] considers the zero-or-one interaction rate. When two individuals share the same (or similar
enough) phenotype, they play game. Otherwise no interaction happens. In the second class [22,
48–51] interactions are contingent on the outcomes of previous interactions. This in fact forms
a feedback loop. An exception comes when the interaction stochasticity is considered [37], but
the stochasticity itself does not evolve. Our model introduces the diversity of interaction rate by
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associating the rate with the degree of similarity, which is measured by the number of the same
expressed phenotypes between individuals. This diversity does not rely on the information of
preceding interactions. Natural selection acts on the population totally on the individual level.
Many mechanisms have been proposed maintaining phenotypic diversity under natural selec-
tion, such as mutant games [52], sexual selection [53], coevolving host-parasite population [54],
occasional recombinations of tags and of strategies [24], and phenotype noise [30, 31, 33, 55, 56].
Diversity of phenotype expression can add to these mechanisms. Instead of assigning the num-
ber of phenotypes to express, our model allows individuals to express an arbitrary number of the
potentially expressible phenotypes. The phenotypes expressed are subject to evolutionary force.
Phenotypic diversity is therefore an evolvable trait. The frequency-dependent evolutionary dynam-
ics drive the population to equilibrate at low levels of phenotype expression, and thus providing
an adaptive explanation for the phenotypic diversity.
Two key themes in evolutionary biology, the evolution of cooperation and the diversity of
phenotype expression, are naturally combined into our model. Populations seek to optimize fit-
ness in evolutionary processes, while survival of cooperators are constrained through competition
with defectors. To overcome the survival threat, cooperators may evolve the system of pheno-
type expression diversity through which they can distinguish potential partners. This conjecture
is of pertinent consequence to many observations in biological circles [56–58]. Salmonella Ty-
phimurium can either express virulence, or not. The side-blotched male lizards exhibit diverse
colors in throats [56, 57]. In these examples, individuals have no difference in terms of carrying
the potentially expressible phenotypes. They can regulate expression of phenotypes according to
competitors faced, or even fluctuating environments. Our model is abstracted from these biological
examples and has implications for and awaits the confirmation of field experimental studies.
V. METHODS
A. Fixation probability
We here briefly illustrate the general procedure for calculating the fixation probability. In the
limit of small mutation rate, the population simultaneously admits at most two different types of
individuals, say A and B. Denote by KA and KB the phenotypes expressed by individuals A and B,
respectively. Denote by sA and sB the behavioral strategies of individuals A and B, respectively.
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Denote by i the number of As in the population. The Moran process that describes the evolutionary
race has two absorbing states: i = 0 and i = N. When the population arrives at either of these
two states, it would stay there forever. Denote by φi the fixation probability that the population is
eventually absorbed into the state i = N when starting with the state i.
With this preparing work, we can easily write down the expected payoffs for an individual A
and B as PA and PB, respectively.
PA = r(KA, KA)(b − c)sA(i − 1) + r(KA, KB)(bsB − csA)(N − i) − θKA
PB = r(KA, KB)(bsA − csB)i + r(KB, KB)(b − c)sB(N − i − 1) − θKB
The fitness for A and B is fA = e
βPA and fB = e
βPB, respectively. We consider the linear interaction
rate as r(KA, KB) =
k
|G| , with k being the number of identical phenotypes individuals A and B
possess. |G| is the number of potentially expressible phenotypes carried. In an updating event,
the population can increase one, decrease one, remain unchanged in terms of the number of As,
and corresponding probabilities are Ti,i+1 =
i fA
i fA+(N−i) fB ·
N−i
N
, Ti,i−1 =
(N−i) fB
i fA+(N−i) fB ·
i
N
, and Ti,i =
1 − Ti,i+1 − Ti,i−1, respectively. Then we have
φi = Ti,i+1φi+1 + Ti,i−1φi−1 + Ti,iφi
Using the boundary conditions φ0 = 0 and φN = 1 we can obtain the fixation probability as
φ1 =
(
1 +
N−1∑
l=1
l∏
k=1
Tk,k−1
Tk,k+1
)−1
B. Transition rate for pairwise competing strains
We here compute the rate the population transits from state X to Y , which means the proba-
bility that strain Y as mutant invades and takes over the population of X strain. Suppose strain X
expresses KX phenotypes and strain Y expresses KY phenotypes. We should always bear in mind
that as phenotype expression is random, for a giver number of phenotypes to express, the actu-
ally expressed phenotypes can vary. Denote by ρk
X→Y the fixation probability that a single mutant
Y takes over the resident population X when X and Y share k common phenotypes among their
expressed phenotypes.
Then the expected transition rate from state X to Y , say Q(X, Y; KX, KY), is given by
11
Q(X, Y; KX, KY) =
min{KX ,KY }∑
k=max{0,KX+KY−G}
( Kx
k
)( G − Kx
Ky − k
)
( G
Ky
)
ρkX→Y (1)
Here min{x, y} means the minimal of x and y and max{x, y} means the maximal of x and y, and
( Kx
k
)
means the combination number of choosing k from Kx. Some explanations on the lower
and upper boundary of the summing are necessary. Whenever KX and KY is no more than G, the
expressed phenotypes strains X and Y share can be 0. Whenever KX and KY is larger than G, the
expressed phenotypes strain X and Y share can be at least KX +KY −G. The expressed phenotypes
strain X and Y share can be at most min{KX, KY}. This situation occurs when both strain X and
Y happen to express phenotypes including these min{KX, KY } phenotypes. We can use Equation
(1) to analytically derive the transition rates between different population states in the limit of rare
mutations and for any intensity of selection β.
C. Stationary distribution
As the cost of expressing phenotype linearly increases with the number of phenotypes ex-
pressed, individuals expressing too many phenotypes would be easily invaded by those who ex-
press not so many phenotypes. In the long run, their fractions would be negligible. It is therefore
reasonable to bound the number of potentially expressible phenotypes by a number |G|. In the
limit of rare mutations, the population will most of the time stay in one of these 2G homogeneous
states. In other words, there are simultaneously at most two differing strains present in the popu-
lation before next mutation occurs. Therefore, the population dynamics of 2G strains can be well
approximated by an embedded Markov chain between these G full defective states and these G
full cooperative states. For convenience’s sake, we label cooperative strains with even numbers
2KC , and defective strains with odd numbers, 2KD−1, for 1 ≤ KC ≤ G and 1 ≤ KD ≤ G. For strain
X expressing KX phenotypes and strain Y expressing KY phenotypes, the expected transition rate
from state X to state Y is Q(X, Y; KX, KY) as shown by Equation (1). We can then easily get the
transition matrix A with dimension 2G × 2G. The i jth entry of matrix A is Q(i, j; Ki, K j) for i , j,
and the iith entry is one minus the sum of all other entries in the ith row. It is worth noting that we
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have analytically derived the transition rates between any two competing strains and thus the tran-
sition matrix. The normalized left eigenvector associated with the eigenvalue 1 of the transition
matrix A provides the stationary distribution of these 2G states. The overall cooperative level can
be obtained by summing all the elements with even indices in normalized eigenvector [59, 60].
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FIG. 1: Random phenotype expression leads to interaction diversity. All individuals carry the same number,
in this schematic illustration, say G = 5, of potentially expressible phenotypes and their ability varies in
expressing phenotypes. Each individual expresses a certain number of phenotypes at a cost proportional to
the number. Phenotypes expressed take a toll on interaction rate. In panel a, individuals G1 and G2 each
carry five expressible phenotypes. Individual G1 expresses three phenotypes, say, Blue, Yellow and Green.
G2 also expresses three phenotypes, say, Blue, Red and Green. Gray sections are unexpressed phenotypes
and invisible. As the specific phenotypes vary in position, G1 and G2 just share one phenotype of those
expressed. They would play the Prisoner’s Dilemma game with probability 1/5. In panel b, individuals G3
and G4 share three phenotypes in common of those expressed, they thus interact with probability 3/5. The
more phenotypes one expresses, the more likely he can interact with others yet the higher cost he shall bear
on expressing these phenotypes.
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FIG. 2: Pairwise invasion dynamics. Transition rate means the probability that the population moves from
an invaded state to an invading state. The capital letter, C or D, along the Y-axis, denotes the mutant’s
behavioral strategy, while the one along the X-axis denotes the residents’ behavioral strategy. The coordi-
nate value denotes the number of phenotypes expressed. Parameters: N = 20, b = 1.0, c = 0.3, β = 0.1,
θ = 0.30, G = 20.
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FIG. 3: Fraction of these 2G strains in stationary state. The bars are obtained by solving the eigenvector of
the 2G × 2G transition matrix. Blue denotes cooperative strain, and red defective strain. The abscissa value
represents the number of phenotypes expressed. The evolutionary process is characterized by the Moran
process, fully depicted in the main text. Parameters: N = 20, b = 1.0, c = 0.3, β = 0.1, θ = 0.30, G = 20.
In a, b, c, d, e, f, θ is 0, 0.05, 0.10, 0.30, 0.50, 1.00, correspondingly, and the overall cooperation level is
0.241, 0.353, 0.454, 0.693, 0.722, and 0.667, respectively.
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FIG. 4: Time evolution of the competition between cooperative strains and defective strains. When cost of
expressing phenotypes is low, the phenotype expression is most of the time stabilized at quite a high level.
In this situation, interactions happen frequently. The evolutionary fate of strains is mainly determined by
the game outcomes. Defective strains with high levels of phenotype expression dominate the evolutionary
process. When cost of expressing phenotypes is high, such a high cost get hardly compensated by the
payoffs resulting from game interactions. At this time, strains expressing fewer phenotypes are destined to
be selected, which concomitantly takes defective strains more time to chase after and exploit cooperative
strains. Cooperative strains, on the contrary, always interact with each other, though at a very slow rate.
As a result, cooperative strains expressing a very few phenotypes overwhelm the evolutionary process.
Parameters: N = 20, b = 1.0, c = 0.3, β = 0.1, θ = 0.30, G = 20, µ = 6 × 10−5.
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